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TIMING CONTROVERSIAL DECISIONS
Cass R. Sunstein *
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM
Suppose that members of a state court are prepared to announce a
highly controversial ruling. The court might be prepared to rule that a
state must allow same-sex marriage, that a state may not continue
affirmative action programs, or that a popular environmental statute is
unconstitutional. Suppose too that the opinion is complete and ready to
be made public. Suppose finally that an election will be held in a short
time, and that the court is aware that the ruling will have at least some
degree of relevance to voters. In the most extreme cases, members of the
court believe that the ruling will become a highly salient issue in the
campaign and that many voters might be affected by the decision.
Should the court refuse to issue the opinion until after the election?
As far as I am aware, there is no serious scholarship on the question
whether and when it is appropriate to wait to issue a controversial ruling
until after an election. In this brief essay, I set out and evaluate an
argument in favor of waiting. The central question is whether a court
should not issue a controversial ruling under two conditions: (1) an
election is about to occur; and (2) it is far from unreasonable to suppose
that the decision will affect its outcome. Under those conditions, I shall
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suggest that there is a plausible argument that the court should wait
before issuing the opinion.
The ultimate conclusion cannot, however, be resolved in the
abstract. As I will suggest, everything depends on whether voters will
react rationally to the court's decision, or whether the proximity of the
decision to the vote, and its exploitation by political entrepreneurs, will
distort voters' judgments. There is also a question about judicial
competence to assess the underlying empirical questions. If judges lack
such competence, it might be best for them to ignore the possibility that
their decisions might have electoral effects. My conclusion is that if
courts are able to assess the underlying questions, and ifthe likelihood of
distortion is high, there is a good argument that courts should wait
before announcing their rulings, not least because little is likely to be
lost by a delay.
II. THE CENTRAL CONCERN
In any election, voters have a large menu of items on which to
focus. They might be concerned about national security, unemployment,
climate change, abortion, energy independence, the stock market, the
price of gasoline, or some combination of these. If there is a highly
salient event immediately before the election, it might have a large role,
simply because of its immediacy. Such an "external shock" might well
affect numerous votes.' Suppose, for example, that the nation faces a
terrorist attack a. month before a presidential election; that a natural
disaster, two months before the election, devastates a city; that gasoline
prices fall dramatically in the previous three months; or that the
unemployment rate, in that time, suddenly spikes up. The idea of the
"October Surprise" signals the possibility that events of this kind might
be expected to influence electoral outcomes. We know enough about
human cognition to know that a salient incident can have a significant
effect on people's judgments. A great deal remains to be learned about
this subject. Let us simply stipulate that in imaginable circumstances,
such an effect is likely.
But perhaps there is nothing wrong with that effect. Perhaps voters
are simply updating on the basis of new information. If a terrorist strike
occurs, voters learn that the nation is more vulnerable than they had
1. There is extensive literature on the relationship between this point and monetary policy,
which might be manipulated to help or to hurt an incumbent. See, e.g., Allan Drazen, "Laying Low"
During Elections: Political Pressure and Monetary Accommodation (2002) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
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thought. If unemployment jumps, the economy is apparently weaker
than had appeared. If voters are rationally incorporating new
information, then any external shock provides a legitimate and perhaps
an invaluable input into voter decisions.
We might make some distinctions here. If the relevant event is not
self-consciously timed by anyone, then there is no effort to manipulate
the system-and if voters will rationally incorporate the relevant
information, nothing is amiss. But suppose that some person or
institution has deliberately triggered a salient event, and done so at the
appropriate time for maximum effect. The problem here is that voters
might be deceived, in a way that will affect their judgments. If voters are
unaware of the manipulation, they might believe that, for example, gas
prices or unemployment rates are falling, even though these effects are
temporary ones, made visible by self-interested politicians who are
unable or unwilling to maintain them for the long run. If a terrorist has
been caught two weeks before the election, and if the timing of this
event has been orchestrated to convince voters that an incumbent
administration is winning the war on terror, then voters might be
manipulated to believe that a victory is occurring when in reality it is
not. Consider in this regard the controversial 2006 decision, by the
Internal Revenue Service, to delay in the collection of back taxes until
after the election, in part to avoid negative publicity.
2
Perhaps the political market can expose any real efforts at
manipulation. Perhaps the market functions well enough to ensure that
such efforts will be revealed as such. But suppose that political markets
cannot be expected to work this well. Even if so, the conclusion does not
speak to my question here: No one is arguing that courts should
deliberatively time their announcements in order to influence the
outcome of elections. Everyone agrees that any such effort would be
illicit. The question is whether courts should deliberately time their
announcements so as not to influence the outcome of elections.
The discussion of the effect of manipulation of events shows why
an affirmative answer is not implausible. The risk is that a recent judicial
decision may distort voter behavior, simply because its timing gives
undue salience to a particular issue. No one doubts that recent events can
have large effects on public judgments. Consider the fact that public
concern about risks usually tracks changes in the actual fluctuations in
those risks. But public concern outruns actual fluctuations in the
2. See David Cay Johnston, IRS Going Slow Before Election, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2006, at
2006]
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important case of "panics," bred by vivid illustrations that do not reflect
changes in levels of danger. A "particularly vivid case or new finding
that receives considerable media attention" played a major role in those
leaps in public concern.
4
Legislation itself is often fueled by identifiable events, putting
issues on the agenda that would otherwise be ignored. "Availability
cascades" occur when an available event spreads through the public,
spurring attention to an issue that had formerly been neglected. To take
just one example, legislation calling for disclosure of toxic releases was
spurred by a chemical accident at Bhopal, India, which focused media
attention on the safety issues and led members of Congress to introduce
right-to-know legislation.6 The relevant legislation could not possibly
have been enacted without the highly publicized Bhopal disaster. These
points should be enough to suggest the possibility that in a genuinely
close election, a salient judicial decision will have a large impact,
perhaps even altering its outcome.
Even if it is agreed that a highly visible event can have a large
effect on political processes, we might insist that the effect can be
salutary and sensible, as voters and representatives respond to a problem
that had received too little concern. Undoubtedly sensible responses
often occur. Unfortunately, the optimistic view seems unwarranted, for
at least some of the time, the recent event produces a distorted judgment
and undesirable law.7 Let me therefore sketch a highly tentative
principle: To the extent that salient judicial decisions can significantly
affect voters' judgments, such decisions should not be issued in the
period immediately before an election. Of course this position would be
vulnerable if a great deal were to be lost by the delay. But in ordinary
circumstances, any delay will produce no harm at all; it is not important
for a judicial decision to be announced in October rather than December.
If the delay is costless, and if it avoids a potential distortion, why should
courts refuse to delay?
3. See George Loewenstein & Jane Mather, Dynamic Processes in Risk Perception, 3 J. RISK
& UNCERTAINTY 155, 171 (1990).
4. ld at 172.
5. Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 683, 685 (1999).
6. JAMES T. HAMILTON, REGULATION THROUGH REVELATION: THE ORIGIN, POLITICS, AND
IMPACTS OF THE Toxics RELEASE INVENTORY PROGRAM 184 (2005).
7. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 685, 691-703.
[Vol. 35:1
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III. OBJECTIONS
This position is not a usual one, to be sure; I am aware of no rule,
explicit or implicit, that supports the italicized principle. Because of
what seems to me to be a happy accident, the issue is largely irrelevant
at the Supreme Court level. The Court begins its term in October, and
elections are held in early November; it is therefore most unlikely that
the Court would have to consider whether to delay a decision in order to
avoid electoral effects.
We might imagine three possible objections to the principle I have
described:
1. Precisely because it is a court of law, the court must rule as it sees fit
and ignore its electoral effects. The political consequences are
irrelevant. It certainly does not matter whether an election is imminent.
2. A decision not to issue an opinion is itself a choice-one that will,
by hypothesis, favor one or another side. If, for example, a court
decides to delay issuing an opinion calling for same-sex marriage, it
might well be favoring Democratic candidates. Why should it do that?
It is no more neutral to hold the opinion than to issue it immediately.
3. If the court's decision is controversial, the voters deserve to know
about it before they vote, not after. Suppose that the court is prepared
to rule that a state must permit same-sex marriages. If the court is
interpreting the state constitution, it is possible that the voters will
want to amend that constitution so as to ban same-sex marriages. That
question is a legitimate part of the electoral debate. Ought not the court
let citizens know of its position, rather than wait until a time when it is,
for some purposes, too late? "Holding" an opinion is too strategic; it
smacks of opportunistic behavior on the court's part, an effort to avoid
electoral reprisal.
Let me explore these objections in sequence.
The judicial role. The problem with the first objection is that it is a
conclusion, not an argument. It offers a claim about the court's
appropriate role, but it does not defend that claim. Why, exactly, should
the court ignore the consequences of its decisions?
8. A former commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service took an analogous position with
respect to delaying enforcement action in anticipation of an election, asserting, "Oh my God, that is
unthinkable," but this view is not unanimously held. See Johnston, supra note 2, at A4.
2006]
HeinOnline  -- 35 Hofstra L. Rev. 5 2006-2007
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW
In other domains, courts pay attention to those consequences. On
occasion, the Court refuses to rule on an issue in part because of the
intense political controversy that a ruling would spark.9 Perhaps some
such refusals are unjustified, but it is not easy to defend the proposition
that in considering issues of timing, the Court should always be
indifferent to the public reaction.' 0 If timing matters when the Supreme
Court decides whether to rule, or how ambitiously to rule, then it might
matter as well for state courts attempting to decide whether to hold their
decisions until after the election.
The non-neutrality of delay. The second objection is more forceful.
Suppose that a liberal court, consisting mostly of Democratic appointees,
decides not to issue a liberal opinion, because it does not want to move
voters in the direction of Republican candidates. We should be able to
agree that this decision would be entirely illegitimate; it would be too
narrowly partisan. Judges should not time their decisions so as to help
identifiable candidates and parties. But suppose instead that partisanship
is not involved-that liberal and conservative judges are willing to
support a general practice against issuing controversial opinions, say,
one month before an election. Is this a violation of neutrality? The
second objection insists that it is, because holding the opinion is itself a
decision, and not properly characterized as neutral.
Whether the objection is correct, I suggest, depends on whether
voters are prone to overreaction or are rational updaters. If voters are
prone to overreaction, and if their judgments might be distorted, then
holding the opinion is a decision, to be sure, but it is the right one,
because it prevents what is (by hypothesis) an overreaction. There is
nothing abstractly neutral about a decision to delay; but if that decision
is a sensible way of avoiding a distortion in political judgment, it is
defensible for that reason. Suppose, however, that voters are rational
updaters. If so, there is no reason to hold the decision, and indeed there
is good reason not to do so-an issue to which I now turn.
Informing electoral judgment. The premise of the third objection is
certainly correct. Often a judicial decision is a legitimate part of political
debate, and it deserves to play a role in a campaign. Suppose, for
9. The most famous example involves miscegenation laws. In both 1955 and 1956, the Court
refused to rule on the constitutionality of antimiscegenation laws. See Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749
(Va. 1955), vacated and remanded on procedural grounds, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), reinstated and
aff'd, 90 S.E.2d 849 (Va. 1956), appeal dismissedfor lack offederal question, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
See also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 17 (2004) (declining to rule on the
constitutionality of the words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance).
10. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 240 (1962).
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example, that a state court has invalidated a series of environmental
regulations, or struck down the practice of capital punishment, or called
for same-sex marriage. If so, voters are entitled to take account of those
decisions in casting their votes, especially when the electoral process is
able to overturn judicial decisions (for example, through amendments to
the state constitution). And if voters are rational updaters, this
consideration would seem to be decisive. Why deprive voters of relevant
information before they vote?
But suppose that significant numbers of voters are prone to
overreaction-that their votes will be affected by the immediacy of the
judicial decision, and that if some months had passed, the decision
would have been put into proper perspective. If this is so, the assessment
of the timing issue is not simple. By delaying a decision, the court
deprives citizens of relevant information. By issuing the decision, the
court might distort the electoral process by giving undue salience to a
single event.'l
There is no easy way out of this dilemma. The conclusion would
seem to depend on an empirical judgment about whether the distortion is
expected to be serious. If not, a delay has no motivation; if so, the court
would seem to have good reason to wait. It is important here that if
citizens do not like the court's decision, and if their objections survive a
period of deliberation, then little is lost in a delay. Representatives are
highly likely to respond to an immensely unpopular decision, even if it is
issued a month after the election. Hence the decision to hold the decision
does not deprive voters of ultimate control. I conclude, with some
tentativeness, that if a judicial decision is likely to produce a short-term
overreaction by the public, the better practice might well be to avoid
issuing it.
Questions of judicial competence. There is a final problem.
Suppose that courts do not have good tools for answering the key
empirical questions. Suppose that they do not know whether a decision
would have significant electoral effects, or that their judgments about the
rationality of voters' reactions are highly unreliable. If so, courts might
do well to adopt a firm rule against considering those questions, or at
least a strong presumption, to be overcome only in the most compelling
circumstances. But if courts have adequate tools, they might do well to
time their decisions so as not to produce electoral distortions.
11. For relevant discussion, see generally Daron R. Shaw, A Study of Presidential Campaign
Event Effects from 1952 to 1992, 61 J. POLITICS 387 (1999); Tom W. Smith, Freedom to Conduct
Public Opinion Polls Around the World, 16 INT'L J. PUB. OPINION RES. 215 (2004).
2006]
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IV. NOT A CONCLUSION
My main goal here has been to raise a problem, not to resolve it. If
particular events can have large effects on voters by virtue of their
timing, and if those events can distort rather than inform deliberation,
there is a good reason for courts to hold especially controversial
decisions rather than to issue them immediately before an election. Most
of the time, little or nothing is lost by delay. It is true that the argument
for waiting is effectively answered if voters are rational updaters, giving
recent information no more weight than it deserves; but I have offered
some reasons for doubts on that score. My suggestion has been that
judges might plausibly delay their decisions if the risk of a significant
electoral effect is serious and if the public's judgment would be inflamed
and distorted rather than rational-at least if courts have adequate tools
for answering the empirical questions.
There are more general issues in the background. To what extent do
or should political actors defer controversial decisions? To what extent
do the most recent events actually affect voter behavior?12 To what
extent are those effects a product of rational updating, rather than
distortion as a result of immediacy and salience? If the effects are
significant, what responses, if any, are appropriate on the part of those
involved in institutional design outside of the judicial context? I have not
attempted to answer these questions, but any answers would bear both
on the timing issue on which I have focused here and on broader
questions about the relationship between individual rationality and
collective self-government.
12. See supra note 11.
[Vol. 35:1
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